Aluminium hull Combatant Wrong Match for Pirates

Video from sympathetic local Alabama media, notice the vessels in the background:



Now, here's a real evaluation of how useful or not LCS as configured would be with pirates:

From Information Dissemination

Friday, February 13, 2009

A Question From the Department of Dissent

I believe in the theories I opine through the blog. They do not focus on major power war and high intensity conflict in the maritime domain; rather they focus entirely on littoral warfare and low intensity challenges emerging in the maritime domain. I contend that the line between war and peace at sea is becoming blurred, and the approaches to dealing with both are evolving two very different directions, although with some convergence.

I believe it takes fewer people to kill more people in the 21st century due primarily to the advances in technology; we are simply more lethal than we have ever been in the past. I believe naval forces require more ships for peacemaking than they will for warfighting, and that the costs of warfighting with fewer ships will still be extraordinarily higher than the costs of fielding more ships for peacemaking. I believe that when the Navy takes risk in the development of fleet constitution, the Navy should take risks for peacemaking roles, not warfighting roles, but at no time can the Navy ignore the necessity to field low cost platforms for peacemaking.

I believe unmanned technology will continue to improve our lethality for warfighting, but peacemaking at sea begins with the fundamental requirement of manpower. I believe the platform that will make the largest difference in peacemaking in the 21st century is the mothership for both manned and unmanned systems, but while the mothership may be optimized for peacemaking the platform must be big enough to escalate violence as needed in its operational environment, which for me means the mothership will consist of both manned and unmanned systems.

As I observe the unfolding events off the coast of Somalia, I'm very pleased to find that virtually every one of the theories for peacemaking opined on the blog over the last 20 months are proving true. It is mothership operations with small boats and manned aircraft that is making the most significant impact in the fight against pirates, or said another way; the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is being used as a mothership.

I have been given a bit of smack from folks for calling the USS Freedom (LCS 1) a mothership. It is, it is a small mothership and designed specifically for operating unmanned platforms. With that specific design parameter, I believe the LCS is limited, because as a platform not really built for war but designed specifically for unmanned systems, it is intended for war. I have called out a number of folks for suggesting this is a peacemaker platform. It isn't, it can enable that environment with its unmanned systems and conflicting combination of speed and space, but I disagree with every single person who believes the LCS can do what the USS Vella Gulf (CG 73) is doing, and I can now prove it.

So as a vocal and visible member of the Department of Dissent, I'd like to ask a question to those advocating the 21st Century frigate can do everything, and this particularly applies double for the leftover Bush administration civilians who got their honorary PHDs on 'techno-centric naval requirements and solutions' from the University of Rumsfeld. Can you explain to me how the LCS can do what the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72) is doing, because I think based on just a few photographs it has become pretty obvious we see some fairly obvious flaws in the suggestion the LCS is the everything solution people have suggested.

Observe in photography. Keep in mind these photos appear to be taken from a helicopter, specifically from Mass Communications Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky who is on the USS Vella Gulf (CG 72). He would be the 5th person on any helicopter giving us all the photography, which I believe is an important part of this actually. In the top picture of the first incident I see 2 RHIBs with an 8 person team and 2 helicopters each with 4 person crews. In the bottom picture of the second incident I see 2 RHIBs with 12 person teams and 2 helicopters with 4 person crews. Add one more if you want photo drama. Click the images; use high resolution to count heads yourself if needed.

This means 25 naval personnel were involved in the first picture, and 29 naval personnel were involved in the second incident. The LCS has a maximum crew size of 75 by design, and there just isn't berthing space for more.

Will someone please explain how the LCS does this job? The Freedom (and I bet Independence) can carry 2 H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts in the hanger, although the current configuration calls for only 1 H-60 with the modules. Trust me, there is plenty of room for two on Freedom, I measured it myself. There is also plenty of space in the module bays for multiple RHIBs, indeed the LCS could deploy 2 manned RHIBS and 2 armed unmanned RHIBS with room to spare. It does appear the LCS can carry the equipment for this role, but there is a problem, where do the people come from? There is even room in the mission bay for the makeshift prison like what the Navy has done on the USNS Lewis and Clark (T-AKE 1).

A core crew of 40, a crew of 15 mission module, and a crew of 20 for aviation takes the total up to 75. Does anyone else think there might be a problem with the whole platform peacemaking model when your 3000 tons ship has to use 1/3 of its total personnel to round up a little dingy full of bad guys?

Think about the crew breakdown a minute. 40 core crew. I would assume we would want an 8 man Coast Guard LEDET team, which leaves 27 spots for the aviation crews to run potentially two H-60s and 3 Fire Scouts. For just 1 H-60 and 3 Fire Scouts, the current requirement is 20 people, so the extra H-60 would only give you 7 more people, 4 which would be the crew. That gives you three spare berths on the ship to fill, which I'd bet is not enough to help out the second H-60, so the question is whether those 7 would be enough to operate 2 armed USVs when the normal module requirement is more than double (15).

Anyone else seeing the problem here? The LCS is not built for joint operations with the Coast Guard, which is exactly what peacemaking is. The LCS is built for countering small boat threats... BUT PIRACY IS A SMALL BOAT THREAT... and the LCS can't even do 2 manned RHIBs and 2 H-60s while including a LEGIT detachment from the DOG. This is why the techno-centric requirement set is such a load of crap, in Rumsfeld's world we blow the living shit out of everything and ask questions later. In what world will our political leadership be allowing that kind of RoE short of major power war?

With all due respect to the advocates of the '21st century frigate' as a way to deal with peacemaking requirements at sea, do the math by counting heads, you are short on manpower! It takes people to fly Helicopters and conduct the work on RHIBS, but it also takes people to control Fire Scouts and operate USVs. When you are short on people, you have to make sacrifices. The 75 crew maximum on the LCS, which is our half a billion dollar littoral do everything platform, prohibits the LCS from actually doing just what we are seeing now. The LCS does not have enough berthing just to do this very simple 2 helicopter and 2 RHIB operation of rounding up a handful of pirates, and we think we need to build 53 more?

This platform is an abortion of requirements planning. The LCS does not have enough crew to do peacemaking. The LCS is built to deploy unmanned technologies, a warfighting capability, but is built to the lowest warfighting survivability standard allowed for Navy ships. The LCS is optimized for speed and space, despite the obvious problem of adding stuff in the space creating weight that slows down the speed. Why is it asking too much to build a littoral ship with characteristics that compliment rather than compete with one another?

This ship is proving my USS Langley analogy correct every day, because it can do what it was built to do, it just can't do it very well. We didn't convert towards 55 Langley class aircraft carriers; we learned our lessons and moved on. With so many obvious problems with the LCS, starting with the fact the ship is great right up until contact with the enemy (which is what 2 RHIBs and 2 H-60s is!), clearly this ship needs partners to utilize all that information gathering capability the ship actually can do.

Peacemaking at sea requires manpower. This is a solid example of how manpower intensive even a simple peacemaking operation like rounding up a handful of pirates off a tiny vessel at sea can be. This is also a solid example how the LCS cannot do what everyone wants it to do, not without the other platforms able to contribute the manpower needed for low intensity operations.

If I'm wrong, please explain how. 75 - 40 crew - 20 aviation crew = 15 people left to be divided among Coast Guard LEDET, another helicopter, and unmanned systems supporting operations. This is one of many problems the Navy faces by intentionally making reduced crew size a priority, as opposed to letting the actual requirements in the field determine how many sailors you need.

Posted by Galrahn at 1:17 PM

And here's a recent article on the changing need for speed and fuel-efficiency regarding LCS:

From www.Forbes.com

US Navy studies slower but cheaper LCS ships
By Andrea Shalal-Esa 03.20.09

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Under pressure to cut the cost of its Littoral Combat Ship program, the U.S. Navy is studying whether to lower the required speed and swap out fuel-hogging propulsion systems, said a former senior Navy analyst and another source informed about the effort.

The study, led by Naval Sea Systems Command, could lay the groundwork for a change in one of the key selling points of the new ships, which can reach speeds of over 45 knots, but whose costs have more than doubled since 2002, said the sources, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the study.

Lockheed Martin Corp and General Dynamics Corp are working on separate designs of the new ship, which was initially slated to cost $220 million a piece. The first two ships are now due to cost well above $500 million.

The Navy wants to buy 55 LCS ships as part of its drive to expand the U.S. fleet to 313 ships. It will use the ships for missions including mine-hunting, reconnaissance, pursuit of terrorists and pirates, but naval analysts and even top Navy officials have questioned if the high speed is really needed and worth the price.

Even threats from speedy smaller boats would be countered with the ship's deck gun, or the unmanned helicopter on board, rather than by outrunning such a vessel, analysts said.

"It's all about the cost," said the former Navy analyst, when asked about the motive behind the new Navy study.

The Navy had no immediate comment on the study. Both companies said they were unaware of the Navy-led review.

Navy officials last week said no design changes were planned for the 2009 and 2010 ships, which should help stabilize costs, but officials were reviewing ways to cut the long term cost of operating the ships. They gave no details.

The former analyst said the new warships only needed to operate at high speeds above 35 knots for a few "operational scenarios," but the water jets needed to achieve such high speeds were generally less efficient at lower speeds.

SPEEDY BUT THIRSTY

Big gas turbines in the propulsion system also boost the fuel consumption of LCS ships compared to other Navy ships, which will increase their long-term operating costs.

Rear Admiral Thomas Eccles, deputy commander for ship design at Naval Sea System Command, has said the LCS ships "will drink a lot more fuel per ton" than other surface ships, according to a report by Inside the Navy, a trade publication.

At a conference in December, Eccles questioned whether higher fuel costs were "a price we ought to be paying" for the combat capability of LCS. But he acknowledged that high speed added "real mission value" and might justify higher costs.

Naval analysts were examining the effect of dropping the required speed of 40 knots by about 25 percent to a range in the low 30 knots, said a second source who was told about the study, but asked not to be named because of its sensitivity.

Ronald O'Rourke, a naval analyst with the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, said that over the years, some people had questioned whether there ever was a "rigorous analytical basis" for the speed requirement of 40 knots.

"Navy officials can provide examples of things the ships can do with such a maximum speed, but that's not the same as saying that there was a rigorous analytical basis for the original requirement," he said.

The former Navy analyst agreed, saying that the focus on the high speed of the LCS grew out of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's emphasis on "transformational" programs.

Aside from some quick studies done early on, the analysis that built the case for a fast, shore-hugging ship was done after Navy officials decided to move ahead with the program, said the analyst, who said he participated in that process.

CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN

Lawmakers have grown frustrated with the program's cost overruns, which the Navy blames on changes made after the program begun, higher material costs and lack of oversight.

The Navy is now pressuring the companies to lower the price in order to lock in follow-on contracts. The goal is to meet a congressional cost cap of $460 million each, beginning in 2010.
Congressional aides say they are not certain the Navy will get the money it wants for the program in fiscal 2010, that begins Oct. 1, given lawmakers' lingering concerns.

Democratic Representative Gene Taylor, who heads the seapower subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, last week warned the Navy to get costs under control before his panel begins weighing the Navy's budget requests.

One Senate aide said changing the required speed of the ship at this point would add cost for design changes in the short term, and could raise eyebrows among lawmakers already frustrated by the Navy's inability to stick to requirements.

But such a move could cut the price of each future ship by tens of millions of dollars, helping the companies reach the congressional cost cap, said another congressional aide.

O'Rourke said changing the propulsion system completely could add cost initially, but scaling back the existing system by substituting lower power engines would take less work.

He said the freed up space and weight could allow the ship to carry more fuel, which would increase its cruising range.

Jim McAleese, defense consultant, welcomed the Navy study and said it could help avert a move by Taylor to open the program to competition from other companies, a move McAleese said would likely result in a two-year delay in the program.

"Anything you can do to pull requirements off that ship -- even if it means reducing the sprint speed -- gets you under $500 million a copy and closer to the congressional cost cap." (Reporting by Andrea Shalal-Esa; Editing by Tim Dobbyn)