Aggressive Corrosion in Austal's Pride and Joy

Was thinking about getting rid of this page just last week.

But wait!, the story never seems to die:

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-17/navy-finds-aggressive-corrosion-on-austal-s-combat-ship-1-.html

"Navy Finds ‘Aggressive’ Corrosion on New Ship"
By David Lerman and Tony Capaccio - Jun 17, 2011

The U.S. Navy has discovered “aggressive” corrosion in Austal Ltd. (ASB)’s first new combat ship designed for operating close to shore.

The corrosion is in the propulsion areas of the USS Independence, the Littoral Combat Ship built by the Mobile, Alabama-based subsidiary of Australia’s Austal and General Dynamics Corp. (GD)

“This could be a very serious setback,” said Norman Polmar, an independent naval analyst and author in Alexandria, Virginia. “If the ship develops a serious flaw, you’re not going to continue producing them.”

Permanent repair will require drydocking the ship and removing its “water jets,” a key component of the propulsion system, the Navy said in a written statement to congressional appropriations committees provided to Bloomberg News.

Aluminum-hulled ships such as Austal’s tend to rust faster than steel-hulled ships, Polmar said. “But I’m surprised it happened so early,” he said. “This ship is brand new.”

The corrosion discovery in a ship that was commissioned in January 2010 marks another blow to the Littoral Combat Ship program, planned to ultimately consist of 55 ships. In February, the Navy discovered another ship in the series, from another construction team, had a crack through the hull.

Close to Shore

The Littoral Combat ships are designed to operate closer to shore than the rest of the Navy's surface fleet. They would make up about 17 percent of the Navy’s planned 313-ship fleet. Missions include clearing mines, hunting submarines and providing humanitarian relief.

The Navy in December awarded contracts for as many as 10 Littoral Combat ships to each of two teams of builders, led by Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT) and Austal.

Austal won a $465 million contract that could reach as much as $3.78 billion if all options are exercised, the Navy announcement said. Building all 55 ships will cost the Navy at least $37.4 billion, according to a Pentagon report released in April.

Officials were concerned about the potential for corrosion during construction of the ship because of “dissimilar metals,” particularly near the steel propulsion shafts, the Navy memo said.

Temporary repairs will allow the ship to operate safely in the interim, the Navy said. The Littoral Combat Ships are designed to last about 25 years. Each ship is expected to cost about $36.6 million a year to operate and support.

Two Versions

The Navy is buying two versions from two teams of builders. The other team consists of Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed and Marinette Marine Corp. of Marinette, Wisconsin.

The first Lockheed ship developed a crack as long as six inches through its hull during sea trials in February, prompting a Navy investigation of the design.

Calls to Austal and calls and e-mails to General Dynamics weren’t immediately returned.

The Austal ship is now in Mayport, Florida, undergoing additional testing, the Navy said in its statement. A permanent repair of the existing corrosion damage would be conducted next year, the Navy said.

The Navy statement did not provide an estimate of the cost of the repair work.

Report: Navy's Joint High Speed Vessel at risk in combat

From: http://blog.al.com/live/2010/01/report_navys_joint_high_speed.html

"Report: Navy's Joint High Speed Vessel at risk in combat"
By Sean Reilly January 30, 2010

WASHINGTON -- As the Navy ramps up production of the Joint High Speed Vessel, the Pentagon's chief weapon tester is warning that the low-slung cargo ship has little or no chance of surviving an enemy attack.

Manufactured by Austal USA's Mobile shipyard and modeled on a commercial ferry, the vessel "is not designed or expected to be survivable against weapons effects encountered in combat missions," according to the latest annual review by J. Michael Gilmore, director of operational test and evaluation at the Defense Department.

In a Friday statement, Navy spokeswoman Monica McCoy said the vessel is not designed to operate in uncontrolled environments and thus "does not require the survivability and ability to sustain damage like a surface combatant" ship...>>>Rest of Article>>>

We had this conversation before with regard to aluminium, burn, and things like white phosphorus...

Oh, Man, this Guy Frickin' Pegged it...on LCS and aluminium, etc.

A two day old Op-Ed piece from a former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet:

From: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/01/ship-shopping-list/

"Ship Shopping List" by Adm. James Lyons (Ret.) February 1, 2009

COMMENTARY:

With the economy as the No. 1 priority for the new administration, there will probably be some form of a zero-based review of the federal budget.

Even with two ongoing wars, the Defense Department's budget will receive close scrutiny, as it should. Key programs could be canceled, delayed or changed.

However, the U.S. Navy's surface ship construction program is one of the key programs that needs to be expanded to meet current and future combat ship requirements. The Navy's force projection and assured nuclear strategic capability are key to our retaining U.S. pre-eminence as a world leader. The Navy's anti-ballistic intercept capability is another key element. Even with recognition of these requirements, there has been a loss of confidence in Congress over the ever-changing Navy ship construction programs that suffer from highly publicized cost overruns.

At present, the centerpiece of the Navy's surface ship construction program is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Unfortunately, this program has suffered from a lack of professional oversight that resulted in multiple change orders, culminating in the cost of the first ship more than doubling from the original estimate of $220 million. The U.S. Navy plans to construct 55 LCS ships that can operate close to shore.

The undersecretary of defense for acquisition, John Young, said recently that the Navy is likelier to buy 64 or more of these ships, which cost about $550 million each.

The threat of piracy and the war on terror are given as justifications for the need of an LCS type ship. They are indeed weak reeds. If we changed the rules of engagement for the Task Force ships engaging the pirates and destroyed the shore-based infrastructure that supports their operations, piracy would become less attractive.

For a warship to stand by and do nothing as a hijacked ship is sailed to a pirate holding area should not be an option. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that a lightly armed defensive platform is marginally useful against terrorists operating ashore.

The LCS as originally conceived was to be stealthy; have a 50-knot speed capability; be operable by a small crew; and permit reconfiguration for different type of missions by changing onboard modules, including modules for detecting and countering mines. The costs of any of these modules are yet to be determined.

The overall costs of the LCS are largely driven by the speed requirement of 50 knots. It can be safely assumed that between 30 percent and 40 percent of the current hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) costs are directly attributed to the speed requirement. It is not transparently clear what a 50 knot capability (as opposed to 30 knots) confers in the threat today of Mach 1-plus air and surface launched guided-stealthy missiles plus 70-plus-knot torpedoes. Furthermore, in any type of seaway, the ship will not operate at 50 knots nor will it operate at 50 knots in 20 feet of water unless the intention is to dig a trench in the seabed.

Despite the stated requirement for stealth, it is not optimized in either of the LCS prototypes. Both ships display relatively large radar targets. The mono-hull (Lockheed) is derived from a fast yacht hull form and unsurprisingly, stealth was not an important consideration. The trimaran variant (General Dynamics) provides a radar "tunnel" to amplify the radar return from the ship when observed from certain aspects.

Moreover, both hull forms have inherent large and/or noisy acoustic signatures. Further, both prototypes will have predictability large infrared signatures when operating at higher speeds. Neither of these prototypes has anything but a very limited "point" air defense capability. In today's expanding threat environment, any ship designed to be a 21st-century warship is fatally flawed that costs more than $550 million and does not incorporate multiple fire-control systems and a reasonable area air defense capability against stealthy cruise missiles. The argument that an air defense "umbrella" for the LCS will be provided by other air and surface platforms is suspect, if only because the LCS is touted as a precursor weapons system, intended to "sanitize" littoral waters.

In the bid to reduce weight (for speed) both designs include significant amounts of aluminum, but little or no composites in their superstructure. One is almost all aluminum. We continue to ignore the lessons drawn from the Falklands war where British ships with aluminum superstructures burned to the gunwales in a littoral sea fight with Argentine aircraft-delivered iron bombs and French short-range Exocet missiles. Perhaps we should review the logic presented in the mid-1980s when we opted for an all-steel Arleigh Burke DDG-51 destroyer.

What should be done? The current Navy leadership inherited the LCS program. With the budget constraints Navy ship acquisition programs will face, we simply cannot afford to build a class of ships with the limited capabilities of an LCS. We should step back, acknowledge the LCS shortcomings and look at alternatives currently available.

The Norwegian Aegis frigate, which is a derivative of the Spanish F-100 Aegis frigate, is a candidate that should receive careful consideration. It has a speed of 28 knots; is stealthy and is capable in terms of area AAW and ASW with its Aegis combat system, electro-optical director; hull mounted and towed array sonar, two MK82 fire-control radars, and 127MM and 76MM guns. It also has the capability to host organic manned and unmanned air and surface vehicles. The cost for this very capable warship is about $600 million. Its draft is 5 meters, which also compares favorably with the LCS.

Changing the program is the first step. To ensure proper management and oversight, the Navy must also rebuild its in-house civilian technical capability which in the past played major roles in bridging the gap between combat commanders' stated requirements and the contract specifications given to industry in the procurement of ships, aircraft and weapon systems.

A recent study concluded that the Navy's in-house technical capability (civilian and naval officer) has been greatly diminished and is rapidly losing capability and capacity. The disciplines involved in building a commercial ship in no way translate to building a warship. There are no short cuts.

The Navy needs to rebuild the civilian technologist community by providing a clear career path. The Navy also needs to rebuild the Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community. The two-year Naval Architecture/Marine Engineering Master's program at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was canceled two years ago, should be reinstated.

There is no question that numbers of ship matter, but combat capability and survivability should be the governing criteria. The notion that somehow "little" combatants are expendable is nonsense. Certainly the crews are not, nor are the ships. Unfortunately, we don't have the luxury of time to redesign a small combatant. Until we do, we should embrace the European-Norwegian Aegis-type Frigate, which was principally designed for "littoral combat."

James Lyons, U.S. Navy retired admiral, was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters.

Aloha, Brad

Remember the JHSV Contract Awarded Overbudget?

In follow-up to: JHSV Contract Awarded Well Over Budget and Aluminium and Steel Price History.

From the Financial Times, Dec. 4-5, Aluminium prices and the outlook have come down even more in the past month from when we last looked at it:

"...In the base metals market, aluminium prices sank below the $1,600 a tonne level, reaching a four-and-a-half year low, amid mounting gloom about the outlook for prices and the future of the industry. The benchmark London Metal Exchange three-month aluminium contract sank 2.2 per cent to $1,580 a tonne yesterday, the lowest level since May 2004. Aluminium has fallen 53.2 per cent since hitting a record $3,380 a tonne in early July. Stocks of aluminium at LME warehouses increased by a hefty 19,500 tonnes yesterday and have risen to 1.86m tonnes, the highest level for fourteen years. Rising inventories, which reflect the deepening downturn in global industrial activity, particularly in the carmakers and construction sectors, have weighed heavily on aluminium prices. “The industry is struggling to cope with both an overhang of spare capacity and a huge level of unconsumed inventory,” said Dan Smith, metals analyst at Standard Chartered. An estimated 65 per cent of aluminium smelters worldwide are estimated to be losing money at current price levels...Standard Chartered is forecasting that aluminium prices will average $1,825 a tonne next year, rising to $2,000 in 2010."

That's between 35 to 53% below what would have been budgeted for the aluminium.

Not expecting much from Obama "reformers,"
Aloha, Brad

Aluminium and Steel Price History

Additional data in furtherance of the following post:
JHSV Contract Awarded Well Over Budget

Aluminium costs into JHSV and LCS are about 50% of what they were as recently as last summer, and steel costs into LCS are about 25% of what they were as recently as last summer:

From: http://www.metalprices.com/FreeSite/metals/al/al.asp#MoreCharts



We are back to 2004 prices for aluminium:



The recent contract for the one JHSV is over budget beyond any legitimate reason.

Re: LCS and steel cost see: http://www.metalprices.com/FreeSite/metals/steel_futures/steel_futures.asp
And: http://www.metalprices.com/FreeSite/metals/Steel/DJSteel.asp

We are also back to 2004 prices for steel:
http://finance.google.com/finance?chdnp=1&chdd=1&chds=1&chdv=1&chvs=maximized&chdeh=0&chdet=1227229308733&chddm=572424&q=INDEXDJX:.DJUSST&ntsp=0

Below is an interesting graphic on past steel demand by region on the world. Notice the U.S. demand under NAFTA and relatively how large the China demand is. The China demand for steel is what is dramatically falling right now. For what will be happening to China's economy, look for political unrest there within a year or two if these economic trends continue.



Aloha, Brad