JHSV Hawaii Superferry Predecessor Design Falling Apart for the Navy/DOD

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-14/navy-s-fast-sealift-ships-can-t-stand-buffeting-from-high-seas

New Navy Ships Have Trouble Surviving the High Seas

 by Anthony Capaccio  January 14, 2016

• - Austal's Expeditionary Fast Transport ships need bow repairs
• - U.S. Navy adopted a flawed design to save weight, report finds

The U.S. Navy is spending millions of dollars to repair new high-speed transport ships built by Austal Ltd. because their weak bows can’t stand buffeting from high seas, according to the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester.

“The entire ship class requires reinforcing structure” to bridge the twin hulls of the all-aluminum catamarans because of a design change that the Navy adopted at Austal’s recommendation for the $2.1 billion fleet of Expeditionary Fast Transports, Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation, said in a report to Congress.

USNS Spearhead

 

Source: Austal Ltd.

“The Navy accepted compromises in the bow structure, presumably to save weight, during the building of these ships,” Gilmore wrote lawmakers, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John McCain, in a September letter that wasn’t previously disclosed. “Multiple ships of the class have suffered damage to the bow structure.”

The speedy catamarans are designed to transport 600 short tons of military cargo and as many as 312 troops for 1,200 nautical miles at an average speed of 35 knots. They’ve been deployed to Africa and the Middle East as well as to Singapore as part of the U.S.’s Pacific rebalance and are being considered by military officials for expanded use there by the Marines. The vessels fill a transport gap between larger, slower vessels and cargo aircraft.

Meets Criteria

Michelle Bowden, a spokeswoman for Henderson, Australia-based Austal, deferred comment to the Navy. Captain Thurraya Kent, a Navy spokeswoman, said the service accepted Austal’s recommendation because the company’s analysis showed the lighter-weight bow met criteria of the American Bureau of Shipping and Pentagon requirements. She said in an e-mail that Gilmore’s report confirms that the vessel “meets and in certain area exceeds” key performance parameters.

The Navy bought 10 of the shallow-draft vessels, at about $217 million each. Five have been delivered and are in operation, while the other five are under construction at Austal’s Mobile, Alabama, shipyard. Senator Richard Shelby, Republican of Alabama, is a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, which added $225 million for an 11th vessel to the fiscal 2016 defense spending bill last month.

So far, the Navy has spent almost $2.4 million strengthening the bow of the first four vessels delivered since late 2012.

Repair costs include $511,000 on the initial vessel, the USNS Spearhead, which was damaged during deployment by waves slamming into the superstructure, according to test data cited by Gilmore and the Military Sealift Command.

The second, third and fourth vessels cost as much as $1.2 million each to repair and a fifth vessel, the USNS Trenton, awaits its bow reinforcement during its next scheduled shipyard visit, Tom Van Leunen, a spokesman for the Military Sealift Command, which owns the vessels, said in an e-mail.

Added Weight

The retrofits have added 1,736 pounds to the ship’s weight, displacing 250 gallons of fuel but having a minimal impact on the vessel’s range when fully loaded, Gilmore said. His concern about the vessel is likely to be highlighted in his annual report on weapons testing that’s scheduled to be released by Feb. 1.

“Since the repairs are still in progress, there has been no heavy weather testing yet to verify if the fixes are sufficient,” Marine Corps Major Adrian Rankine-Galloway, a spokesman for Gilmore, said in an e-mail.

Even with reinforced structures, the fast transport ships operate under sailing restrictions because “encountering a rogue wave” can “result in sea-slam events that causes structural damage to the bow structure,” Gilmore wrote. The operating restrictions include requiring vessels to wait out the highest seas or travel at speeds much lower than their maximum, according to Gilmore’s report.

Van Leunen, the Military Sealift Command spokesman, said that “the Navy routinely diverts ships during transits to avoid heavy weather” and this ship is no exception. Its primary missions will often be in coastal waters that offer “some protection from weather and sea state when compared to open ocean transits,” he said.

Generator Reliability

The vessel’s latest sea tests also were marred by the poor reliability of generators made by Fincantieri SpA that supply electrical power, according to Gilmore. The generators failed “at a much greater rate than predicted.”

Required to operate 8,369 hours between major failures, the generators failed as soon as 208 hours at some points, improving to 1,563 hours in the most recent tests.

Fincantieri spokesman Antonio Autorino said in an e-mail that “the concerns described in the report have been resolved and this information was provided to the Navy, yet was not included in the report.”

The Goal: LCS Update

Source: http://www.coltoncompany.com/

Four More LCSs Contracted Bypassing the DoD's DefenseLink system, the Navy announced yesterday the exercise of options on its contracts with the two LCS contractors covering the next four ships, LCS 9 through 12. Read the announcement here. The table below shows the current status of the program. March 17, 2012. Type # Name Builder $mm Delivery Status LCS 1 Freedom Marinette Marine 19-Sep-08 Active LCS 2 Independence Austal USA 18-Dec-09 Active LCS 3 Fort Worth Marinette Marine 471 12-Jun Building LCS 4 Coronado Austal USA 434 13-Mar Building LCS 5 Milwaukee Marinette Marine 437 14-Aug Building LCS 6 Jackson Austal USA 432 14-Feb Building LCS 7 Detroit Marinette Marine 377 15-Aug Building LCS 8 Montgomery Austal USA 369 14-Oct Building LCS 9 Little Rock Marinette Marine 357 16-Feb Building LCS 10 Gabrielle Giffords Austal USA 346 15-Aug Building LCS 11 Sioux City Marinette Marine 357 16-Aug Building LCS 12 Omaha Austal USA 346 16-Mar Building

"Conspiracy Ferry: Did we get taken for a ride by Hawai‘i Superferry?"

Another very good article by NYT's freelance reporter Chris Pala:

From: http://honoluluweekly.com/feature/2009/03/conspiracy-ferry/

Conspiracy Ferry:

Did we get taken for a ride by Hawai‘i Superferry?

Christopher Pala
Mar 25, 2009

---

Hawai‘i’s Superferry ended its choppy ride last week, leaving tantalizing clues, but no proof, that the whole venture was about more than providing “reliable commercial service in these islands,” as CEO Thomas B. Fargo insisted at his dawn press conference.

“You look at the players involved, you have to question their motives, there are some pretty significant defense contracts involved,” said Rep. Hermina Morita, who chairs the House Energy and Environmental Protection Committee.

The defense contracts come in two categories.

First, the construction of the two ferries by Austal USA helped the young company get a contract to build a military version of the fast cargo and troop-transport ship—with an option for nine others—for a total of $1.6 billion, according to defense analysts and Austal USA itself. It also played a role in getting a contract for a Littoral Combat Ship prototype, a separate project to build up to 50 fast, aluminum warships at more than twice the price for each. The question is: was that the real purpose of building the Superferry?

Second, there are the ferries themselves. Now that the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has freed them of any obligation to serve the Islands, which has proved to be a money-losing operation, are they going to fetch a better price elsewhere? If they do, was that the main point for building them and bringing them here?

Austal and INCAT are the two giants of the big, fast aluminum catamaran business that have been supplying the world market for decades from their shipyards in Australia. Unlike most countries, the United States can’t buy foreign vessels for internal or military use: the Jones Act specifies they must be built domestically. So to crack the American market, Austal and INCAT needed to set up shipyards in the United States. Austal USA set up shop in Mobile, Ala., in 2001 and INCAT partnered with Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. in South Lockport, La., both with their eye on a contract for a military version of the Superferry.

By the summer of 2004, when work started on the first Superferry, Austal USA had built eight ships, all smaller than the Superferry. “Bollinger/Incat [USA] was a credible threat,” Bill Pfister, VP for external relations at Austal USA, said in a telephone interview from Mobile. “Building the Superferry was very helpful in demonstrating that we can build these ships in the United States as well as Australia, it was a major part of our credibility, almost a prerequisite,” he said. “It allowed us to build up the work force and the facilities.” Once the first Superferry was finished, that work force moved to the Littoral Combat Ship prototype, he said. And last November, as work was ending on the second Superferry, the Huakai, Austal beat Bollinger/Incat USA for the contract for the military version of the Superferry, called the Joint High Speed Vessel—essentially a Superferry with a helipad in the back.

In an interview together last year, Tig Krekel, vice chairman and partner of J.F. Lehman & Company, an investment bank in New York, and John Garibaldi, a former Hawaiian and Aloha Airlines executive who was CEO of Hawai‘i Superferry when it launched service, described how Garibaldi, Tim Dick and Terry White started the project together, financing it out of their savings until early 2004, when they raised $3.3 million. In September 2004, Lehman & Company took over the company and its principal, John F. Lehman, signed a deal to provide $85 million for the first Superferry.

“The ship started being built in summer of ’04, basically on spec,” Garibaldi said. “It was done on verbal assurances from Lehman and me that we would not leave them with the ship.” By the fall of 2005, Krekel said, Lehman was chairman of the board and the Maritime Administration was ready to guarantee $140 million of the $185 million loan.

Garibaldi said the shipyard had started building the ship “on spec” because the project’s financial success was so obvious “it was a no-brainer.” Krekel added, “We expect service to grow to five ships, the market’s there.”

But Alan Lerchbacker, the founding CEO of Austal USA, painted a different picture in an interview in Honolulu with Pacific Business News published on January 19, 2007, the same week Hawai‘i Superferry took delivery of the Alakai.

“I just worry about getting enough business to cover costs because of the sheer size of it,” he was quoted as saying. “They may need 400 to 500 passengers to break even.” Indeed, Hawai‘i Superferry executives had said the financial break-even point lay at 50 percent capacity, or 143 cars and 433 passengers, which the Superferry rarely attained.

Lerchbacker said he had suggested a 220-foot vessel, but the company chose the 326-foot model–and then another one of 344 feet.

Still unclear is whether Austal started building the Alakea “on spec” because it was the perfect way to prove its mettle to the military procurement community or because it believed that whatever the Hawai‘i plan’s merit, the ship itself would be attractive to the military. Also opaque is J.F. Lehman & Co.’s financial interest in Austal’s success. Atlantic Marine, which the company purchased recently and has a shipyard that adjoins Austal’s in Mobile, works with steel ships and “has no connection to Austal,” said Tim Colton, a shipping analyst in Florida.

The second kind of military contract that may be involved has to do with what would happen if the Superferries fail in their mission to make money in Hawai‘i or are prevented from operating by the courts.

On Thursday, Superferry CEO Fargo said, “We’re going to have to go out and find other employment for Alakai.” He added, “There are other ferry operations that would like to expand their service. Certainly the military may very well want to lease this particular ship.”

In July, BYM Marine and Maritime News reported, “Austal was recently awarded a new contract to provide additional features and equipment on the second Hawaii Superferry to facilitate its use by the military. This follows on from the long-term charter, since 2001, of the Austal-built 308-foot vehicle-passenger catamaran WestPac Express by the III Marine Expeditionary Force based on Okinawa, Japan.”

Pfister, the Austal vice-president, sidestepped in an e-mail exchange the question of whether a contract had been signed with the military to lease the Huakai. He explained that modification in question is a ramp that allows the ship to discharge cargo pretty much anywhere. It’s not usually used in civilian service because it’s heavy and cuts the number of cars by about 20 to 25, he wrote.

Lori Abe, a spokeswoman for Hawai‘i Superferry, said the ramp was added for use in the Big Island and that BYM is wrong.

Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute in Arlington, Va., said leasing the superferries to the military would be difficult to pull off. “Leasing military equipment is not popular in Congress,” he said. Another analyst, who asked to remain anonymous, added: “Tolerance for leasing rather than buying ran out. Another lease now could be a hard sell.”

But Colton, the analyst, said that if anyone can pull it off, it’s Lehman. The Navy secretary in the entire Reagan administration who famously advocated a 600-ship navy (from about 500) was a major adviser and fund-raiser for John McCain and was seen as his likely his chief of staff. “He’s much better positioned than anyone else to get these boats leased,” Colton said.

While we may never learn what interest Lehman had in helping Austal get the military contracts, the value of the two civilian superferries should soon become apparent.

If Lehman fails to lease them out and stops servicing the loan, the federal maritime administration, the loan’s guarantor, would have to take over the ships and likely sell them to the Navy. That could trigger headlines like “Feds Bail Out Another Well-Connected Fatcat.”

And there would be some irony in Obama’s Navy bailing out one of his most powerful opponents.

Paper of Record Nails It...and 2nd vessel is the 'Huakai'

Well this one is even a notch better than what Koohan just wrote. This article appears in the current New York Times and quotes from two well known leading industry analysts and from a current Austal-USA executive. Chris did an outstanding job with this article. BTW, the second vessel's name is the Huakai...shoulda been the Koa. Reposting with the author's permission:

From: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/us/22ferry.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=superferry%20and%20christopher%20pala&st=cse

A Hawaii Ferry Ends Its Choppy Ride

By Christopher Pala for The New York Times
Published: March 21, 2009

HONOLULU — The Hawaii Superferry made its final interisland voyage last week, capping a period marked by lawsuits, low ridership and suspicion that its ultimate purpose had more to do with military contracts than with connecting the Hawaiian islands.

On Monday, the State Supreme Court effectively grounded the vessel, the Alakai, when it struck down an act passed by the Legislature last year that exempted its operator, Hawaii Superferry Inc., from carrying out an environmental impact study. The company said it would not appeal the decision.

“We’re going to have to go out and find other employment for Alakai,” said the president of Hawaii Superferry, Thomas B. Fargo, a retired Navy admiral who once commanded American forces in the Pacific. “Certainly the military may very well want to lease this particular ship.”

The Marine Corps already leases a similar transport catamaran, the Westpac Express, in Okinawa, Japan.

A shipbuilding analyst in Florida, Tim Colton, said the company’s owner and chairman, John F. Lehman, a former Navy secretary, was well positioned to lease the Alakai and a just-finished sister ship to the Navy.

In its 19 months of sporadic operations, the Alakai — an $85 million, 350-foot aluminum catamaran that sliced through some of the world’s roughest seas at 40 miles per hour — is widely thought to have lost money for Hawaii Superferry. The passenger-vehicle ferry usually operated well below the 50 percent capacity that the company had designated as its break-even point. For much of the winter, it operated at about 25 percent capacity, according to figures released by the company.

Responding to a lawsuit filed by environmentalists, the State Supreme Court initially struck down a permit that the administration of Gov. Linda Lingle, a Republican, had granted Hawaii Superferry to operate its boats without an environmental assessment. After that ruling, Ms. Lingle persuaded the Legislature to pass the act exempting the company from the requirement.

Why the company chose to risk operating without an environmental review, which would have taken the better part of a year, has been the matter of debate across the state, with Mr. Lehman’s background leading to speculation that Hawaii Superferry was primarily hoping to prove itself to the United States military.

Nearly two years ago, a former chief executive officer of Austal USA, an Alabama shipyard that built the Alakai, was quoted in a local weekly, Pacific Business News, as saying the ship was too big for its market of 1.3 million people.

“I just worry about getting enough business to cover costs because of the sheer size of it,” said the executive, Alan Lerchbacker.

Mr. Lerchbacker said that he had suggested Hawaii Superferry order a 230-foot vessel but that the company instead ordered two 350-foot models. The Alakai traveled between Oahu and Maui; the second ferry, the Huakai, was completed last week and had been scheduled to link Oahu and the Big Island.

State Representative Hermina M. Morita, a Democrat and chairwoman of the Committee on Energy and Environmental Protection, said she never thought either ferry would be profitable.

“You look at the players involved,” Ms. Morita said. “You have to question their motives.”

In November, Austal USA was awarded a contract to build up to 10 military versions of the ferry.

Austal’s Australian unit had built scores of giant aluminum catamarans used as fast ferries around the world, but the United States requires that all ships sold to its armed forces must be domestically built.

Austal USA, with a shipyard in Mobile, Ala., was created in 2001. “They have managed to become a major player in a very short time,” said Robert Button, a naval analyst with the RAND Corporation.

Austal USA’s vice president for external affairs, Bill Pfister, said that while the company had built several smaller ships in Mobile, the construction of the two Hawaii ferries had helped it develop the work force and demonstrate the construction processes to bid credibly for a similar military version.

The contract calls for one ship for the Army, with an option for four more for the Army and five for the Navy, for a total of $1.6 billion.

“Building the Superferry was very helpful in demonstrating that we can build these ships in the United States as well as Australia,” Mr. Pfister said.

At a news conference on Thursday, Admiral Fargo denied that Hawaii Superferry had any military agenda.

“We always get the question, ‘Was this designed as a military operation?’ ” he said. “That’s absolutely not true.

“We certainly wouldn’t have gone to the trouble to appoint her with 836 first-class seats, to spend huge sums of money to establish service here in Hawaii if that was our goal, which was unmistakably to provide a regular, reliable commercial ferry service in these islands.”

A version of this article appears in print on March 22, 2009, on page A18 of the New York edition.

"News" from Alabama on LCS and JHSV

From: http://www.al.com/business/press-register/index.ssf?/base/business/1225898169323180.xml&coll=3

"Austal in line to build more combat ships"
Wednesday, November 05, 2008
By KAIJA WILKINSON Business Reporter

"...Late Monday, the Navy asked that each submit bids on five LCS with the intention of giving three to the winning contractor and two to the rival team. The Navy plans to award one contract to each team by January, according to Navy spokesman Lt. Clay Doss. The remaining vessels will be awarded in 2010, he said...

Austal has avoided job cuts thus far, but natural attrition has reduced employment at the Mobile River shipyard to about 900 people, according to Austal. That compares to a peak of about 1,200 last year, when Austal was building both its LCS prototype and a large passenger-vehicle ferry.

Austal also expects to learn within days whether it emerges the winner among three teams vying to build up to 10 military transport vessels known as Joint High Speed Vessels, or JHSV..."

It is interesting that the Bush DoD is clearly trying to lock in the LCS program and make it more appealing. These "contracts" don't mean anything unless they are funded by the new Congress and the next Administration. Same goes for JHSV. There are only 2 more LCS funded by Congress and only 1 more JHSV funded by Congress for the foreseeable future. These Rumsfeld inspired "contracts" are now just an effort to obligate the next Administration and Congress. At a minimum, economic events in the next couple of years will overtake that, even if the Obama Transition may not be paying attention to all of this.

Aloha, Brad