Book Review: "Taking Aim at the Superferry: Local Readings"

SFGate Hawaii Insider: "Taking Aim at the Superferry: Local Readings"

Think global, act local: That's part of the message behind "The Superferry Chronicles: Hawaii's Uprising Against Militarism, Commercialism, and the Desecration of the Earth," the strange but apparently true story of an intriguing concept -- ferry service between the Hawaiian islands -- hijacked by quasi-militaristic backers, blindly endorsed by grasping politicians and vociferously opposed on Kauai by a loose coalition of Native Hawaiians, local residents and environmental activists.

While the legal battles continue to play out in court, the Superferry still sails between Honolulu and Maui, and "Superferry Chronicles" authors Jerry Mander and Koohan Paik, both with Bay Area ties, are still trying to capture national attention for their chilling account of big business/big politics run amok in Paradise. While I can't vouch for the absolute veracity of their seemingly meticulous reporting, I can say that they do not make their charges lightly, and their book has been well received in Hawaii's alternative press (such as the Honolulu Weekly.)

Certainly their transcripts of hearings in which local Kauaians pleaded to have their concerns taken seriously are heartbreakingly authentic. And the image of surfers paddling out in Nawiliwili Harbor to block the Superferry still resonates like a marine version of Tiananmen Square.

Mander, director of the International Forum on Globalization, and Paik, a former San Francisco "Slow Food" activist and now a filmmaker living on Kauai, are in the Bay Area for a two-week stint of readings of their book, published in December 2008. The remaining events, sure to be thought-provoking, are:

Feb. 6 (tonight!) at Books Inc., 601 Van Ness (Opera Plaza), San Francisco, at 7 p.m.;

Feb. 7 (Saturday) at Point Reyes Books, 11315 State Route 1, Point Reyes Station.

Feb. 8 (Sunday) at Book Passage, 51 Tamal Vista Blvd., Corte Madera.

Posted By: Jeanne Cooper (Email) | February 06 2009 at 08:00 AM

Listed Under: Local Hawaiiana | Comments (3) : Post Comment

Comments

In response to comments:

In rough seas it's regularly booked at 1/4 capacity. That's about 4 months out of the year. Over the past year it had only 2 1/2 busy months with heavy bookings, in the Summer. The company's cost structure is such that it needs to be running above 1/2 capacity year-around to be a viable 'going concern.' They clearly haven't been able to do that, so what are they?

Aloha, Brad

Posted By: Mauibrad | February 07 2009 at 09:52 AM

U.S. Rep. Gene Taylor Calls for Changes in Navy's LCS Program

From: http://www.gulflive.com/news/mississippipress/news.ssf?/base/news/1233918920211570.xml&coll=5

"Taylor Calls for Changes in Navy's LCS, DDG Programs"

Friday, February 06, 2009

By SEAN REILLY and GEORGE TALBOT

WASHINGTON - Mississippi Rep. Gene Taylor, an authority on Navy shipbuilding, called Thursday for sweeping changes to the littoral combat ship and DDG destroyer programs, saying that the Bush administration's strategy has been financially crippling "and forced years of delays in providing needed capability to the fleet."

"I hope that the new officials within the Obama administration will reach out to the Congress for ideas and suggestions on shipbuilding programs before creating even more imbalance and uncertainty in the shipbuilding master plan," Taylor, D-Bay St. Louis, said in a statement posted on the House Armed Services Committee's Web site. Taylor chairs the panel's sea power subcommittee.

He had particularly harsh words for the LCS, a relatively small, fast ship intended for close-to-shore missions. One prototype has been built by Austal USA's shipyard in Mobile in partnership with General Dynamics Corp. Another prototype, built to a different design, has been completed by a rival team led by Lockheed Martin Corp...

Taylor urged restructuring the LCS program so that both designs have common combat and propulsion systems. He also recommended removing Lockheed and General Dynamics from their lead roles. Instead, he said, the Navy should place future orders on a fixed-price basis "with any shipyard that possesses the industrial capability to build the vessels."

Lt. Clay Doss, a Navy spokesman, declined comment on Taylor's recommendations. Lockheed also declined comment.

Austal Chief Executive Bob Browning defended the LCS in an e-mail Thursday, saying it "represents one of the most affordable and fastest ways to build the Navy's fleet, particularly in light of the need for such vessels in this world of piracy and terrorism."...

Bill Pfister, Austal's vice president for external affairs, said in a separate message that the company is "in substantial agreement" with much of what Taylor is proposing. In regard to letting other shipyards bid on future orders, Pfister said, "we can compete for our design with the best of any."

Taylor's plan came just days after media reports that the Pentagon wants to temporarily shift more money back into the next-generation destroyer line known as the DDG-1000...

Taylor has been a staunch supporter of the DDG-51. On Thursday, he labeled the ship "the finest destroyer in the world" and alluded to "continuing resistance" from outgoing Bush administration officials to restarting production. Obama has yet to name a new Navy secretary to replace Donald Winter, a Bush holdover.

The DDG-1000 will now cost almost $6 billion per ship, according to John Young, the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, in a memo obtained by Defense News...

Obama needs to appoint his own Navy Secretary and new 'chief weapons buyer.' Here is Rep. Taylor's statement from: http://armedservices.house.gov/apps/list/press/armedsvc_dem/tayloros020509.shtml

For immediate release: February 5, 2009

Taylor Statement on Future of U.S. Naval Shipbuilding

WASHINGTON, DC – Today Rep. Gene Taylor (D-MS), Chairman of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee released the following statement on the future of Navy shipbuilding. “For far too many years I have watched as the size of the Navy fleet has decreased. Each year the Navy changes its plan on how many ships will be built and delays the procurement of ships to future years. The Bush administration’s failed strategy of trying to build ‘transformational’ ships, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the DDG 1000 destroyer, has crippled the Navy shipbuilding budget and forced years of delays in providing needed capability to the Fleet. “In particular, the failure of the LCS program to deliver on the promise of an affordable, capable, and reconfigurable warship only puts the exclamation point on a Bush administration’s strategy that was neither well envisioned nor properly executed. As for the DDG 1000, we will not know the true cost of that program for a number of years but significant cost growth on that vessel will require diverting funding from other new construction projects to pay the over-run. “Lacking the expectation of increased funding available for ship procurement, it is more important than ever to set the Navy on an affordable strategy for ship procurement. Continuing resistance from outgoing Bush administration officials to the common sense strategy of restarting the DDG 51 destroyer class is not helpful to the Navy and the nation. The shipbuilding plan needs less meddling, not more. In my opinion there is absolutely no value in spending even more precious shipbuilding funds to re-design the DDG 1000 as a ballistic missile capable platform when the affordable vessel already exists in the DDG 51 destroyer. “I hope that the new officials within the Obama administration will reach out to the Congress for ideas and suggestions on shipbuilding programs before creating even more imbalance and uncertainty in the shipbuilding master plan. To achieve an affordable, stable shipbuilding plan I recommend the following to the new administration: • Restructure the LCS program with common combat and propulsion systems between the two variants of ships. Divorce from the use of the defense firms as Lead Systems Integrators and bid a fixed price contract directly on a “build to print” basis with any shipyard that possesses the industrial capability to build the vessels. • Truncate the DDG 1000 program. The ship is unaffordable. • Restart the DDG 51 program. Not only is it the finest destroyer in the world but it possesses the capability for strategic missile defense, area air defense, and highly capable anti-submarine defense. Build these ships in quantity. If it improves efficiency to computerize the ship’s design into a 3-D modern ship design tool, then Navy should request that non-recurring engineering funding. • Build combatant amphibious assault vessels, vice the non-combatant versions of the proposed Maritime Pre-Positioning Force (Future) or MPF(F). Use the basic LPD or LHD hull form for any other future large ship, including the next generation cruiser, instead of designing a new hull. • Build a frigate on the common hull of the Coast Guard National Security Cutter. This is an affordable ship (without Navy making wholesale changes in the design) which is exactly the type of vessel necessary for 80% of the Navy’s core missions, including anti-piracy and homeland defense. “I look forward to working with the administration and the Department of the Navy in discussing these issues and implementing the ones that provide the best capability for the Navy. In my opinion, the worst thing that the Department can do is continue the policy of the previous administration and not seek any guidance from the Congress prior to submitting shipbuilding plans that were unacceptable in cost and quantity.” ###

Where to start on the Act 2 Pseudo-"EIS"

[I'll just add that I have already gotten back a number of responses to this post stating that people should just boycott the Act 2 "EIS" comment process. Two of the best responses (one from a plaintiff in the case) raised the point that there is no enforcement mechanism once Act 2 sunsets to enforce nor fund the mitigation measures much less challenge them. That is a legitimate point, all the more reason why Act 2 is unconstitutional. I leave it up to the reader as to whether they want to put more effort into their comments beyond sending in the above point as a comment.--Ed.]

OK, time to get going on this, commenting on the Act 2 P-EIS (Pseudo-EIS). Have been waiting for the Supreme Court to do the right thing, and hopefully they will. For now though, we gotta get going.

The deadline for comments in writing, faxed or postmarked, is by February 23, 2009, with copies of each submission to both the Office of Environmental Quality Control (OEQC) and DOT-Harbors. Commentors are not running late because they don't need to get all of those comments to DOT and OEQC until just before the deadline. It's clear DOT/Belt Collins will be pressed for time in formulating the Final P-EIS because they are already hinting that they need $700,000 more to try to get it done on time, which means they need to put more people on it to maybe get it done and accepted by the final legal deadline of about July 6, 2009. (45 days after Sine Die)

Whether they can get it done on time in an acceptable manner to OEQC depends in large part on how thorough and complex are the comment responses from the public on the draft document. DOT/Belt Collins are suppose to respond to all letters of comment from the public. It remains in question whether they would respond to all content in a given letter, esp. for much longer letters, I suspect probably not necessarily to all content.

Therefore, I am recommending that commentors break up their submissions to OEQC and DOT-Harbors into multiple commenting documents with each seperately submitted commenting letter being on each different topic that they want to comment on. I just verified with OEQC that this can be done, that a person can submit multiple letters of comment on the Act 2 'EIS' by the deadline, and they verified that it can be done and that they and DOT will accept multiply submitted commenting letters from one person on this as long as they are by the Feb. 23 deadline. The OEQC rep. mentioned that he understood that it would make sense that a person might want to submit comments on say "Cultural impacts" and then later decided they also wanted to submit comments on "Natural resource impacts," etc. So, it is allowed, and I think by breaking up ones comments on this huge document will force DOT/Belt Collins to respond to all points that one seeks to make on this. You can fax or mail those multiple submissions.

Now, having said that, Dick Mayer sent out a nice overview of this process almost a month ago. Here that is:

Written comments, mailed or faxed,

postmarked by Monday, February 23, 2009 to:

Ms. Katherine Kealoha
Director, Office of Environmental Quality Control
235 South Beretania Street, Suite 702
Honolulu, HI 96813
Fax: (808) 586-4186

and

Mr. Michael D. Formby
Deputy Director, Department of Transportation Harbors Division
79 South Nimitz Highway
Honolulu, HI 96813
Fax: (808) 587-3652

Here is an easier way to access these 2 huge volumes one chapter at a time:

Here is the PSEUDO - EIS by chapter:

1.1 Cover to Summary

1.2 Table of Contents and Acronyms and Abbreviations

1.3 Chapter 1 Purpose and Need

1.4 Chapter 2 Action and Alternatives

1.5 Chapter 3 Baseline Conditions

1.6 Chapter 4 Potential Impacts and Mitigation Part 1 of 2

1.7 Chapter 4 Potential Impacts and Mitigation Part 2 of 2

1.8 Chapter 5 Land Use Plans and Policies

1.9 Chapter 6 Other Considerations

1.10 Chapter 7 Public Participation and List of Preparers

1.11 Chapter 8 References

2.1 Cover and Table of Contents

2.2 Appendix A Comments by agencies and Individuals

2.3 Appendix B Part 1 of 2 Traffic

2.4 Appendix B Part 2 of 2 Traffic

2.5 Appendix C Endangered Species

2.6 Appendix D

2.7 Appendix E

2.8 Appendix F-1 and F-2

2.9 Appendix F-3 Part 1 of 2

2.10 Appendix F-3 Part 2 of 2

2.11 Appendix F-4

2.12 Appendix G

A good OEQC overview of this process:

Frequently Asked Questions on the

Statewide Large-Capacity Ferry

Environmental Impact Statement

SOURCE: http://oeqc.doh.hawaii.gov/Shared%20Documents/Superferry/2008-12-11-FAQs.pdf

2. What is the action to be evaluated in the EIS?

In accordance with Act 2, Second Special Session of 2007, the action is the improvements made or to be made to commercial harbors throughout the state that require the expenditure of public funds to accommodate the use of a large-capacity ferry vessel company.

3. Who is preparing the EIS?

The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for commercial harbor improvements and is required to prepare the EIS.

4. What’s the difference between an EA and an EIS? Why did it change from being an EA to an EIS?

In general, environmental assessments (EAs) and environmental impact statements (EISs) are documents used to publicly disclose the potential environmental impacts of a proposed action and to assist in decision-making. The content of an EA and an EIS may be quite similar. Both may include similar technical or specialty studies. EIS documents tend to be more detailed and lengthy since they typically involve the analysis of resources that are anticipated to be significantly affected. A primary difference between an EA and EIS is in the process and the scope. The requirements of an EA or EIS are defined by the governing law and its implementing rules or regulations. The law governing a federal EA or EIS is the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). At the state level, the law governing a Hawaii EA or EIS is Chapter 343, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS).

Under both the federal and state laws, if an action is not deemed to be excluded/exempted from further environmental analysis (typically because it is listed as an action that has been previously considered and determined to not pose significant environmental impacts), the next step is the preparation of an EA. The EA is conducted to evaluate the environmental impacts of a proposed action and to determine whether to prepare an EIS or a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI). If a FONSI should be issued, the final EA is submitted with such a finding and the process ends. If, on the other hand, a FONSI is not appropriate, an EIS should be prepared to further evaluate those impacts that may be significant.

In this case, the Legislature in special session, promulgated into law Act 2. Act 2 does not recognize the EA to EIS relationship described above; rather, Act 2 simply requires the preparation of an EIS.

5. I understand that the content of the EIS to be prepared and the process to be followed, as specified in Act 2, will differ from what is required by Chapter 343, HRS, the State’s EIS law, and its implementing rules. What is the difference between an Act 2 EIS and a Chapter 343 EIS?

The EIS to evaluate commercial harbor improvements to accommodate a large-capacity ferry vessel company and its operations is governed under Act 2, and not by Chapter 343, HRS. For those familiar with Chapter 343, HRS, and its implementing rules, distinct differences include the following:

1. There is no requirement for an EIS Preparation Notice under Act 2. The EIS Preparation Notice process serves to reveal environmental concerns by including consultations with appropriate agencies, citizen groups, and concerned individuals. Given the numerous testimonies and comments presented in court and at public meetings associated with this highly publicized case, environmental concerns and concerned citizens and groups have already been identified and will be used to define the scope of the EIS.

2. Act 2 identifies the State of Hawaii Office of Environmental Quality Control (OEQC) as the accepting agency. If this were a Chapter 343 document, the DOT or the Governor would be the accepting agency for the EIS.

3. Act 2 does not specifically require a separate cultural impact assessment (CIA), as defined by Act 50. Act 2 does require that the EIS propose mitigation measures to “avoid, minimize, rectify, or reduce impact, including provisions for compensation for losses of cultural community, historical, archaeological, fish and wildlife resources,…” Despite this, CIAs for each harbor will be done.

6. What is the scope of the EIS?

The scope of the EIS will include an evaluation of the environmental consequences of DOT’s action and its secondary impacts, including impacts of a large-capacity ferry vessel company and its operations. Environmental concerns planned to be addressed include: ocean life and marine animals and plants, including a whale avoidance policy and procedures; water resources and quality; harbor infrastructure; vehicular traffic; public safety and security; controlling the spread of invasive species; cultural resources, including hunting, fishing, and native Hawaiian resources; and economic consequences and impacts.

The EIS process will identify environmental concerns; obtain various relevant data; conduct necessary studies; receive public and agency input; evaluate alternatives; and propose measures to avoid, minimize, rectify, or reduce adverse impacts.

7. What are the contents of the EIS?

The Draft EIS will contain the following:

• Summary sheet.

• Executive summary.

• Table of contents.

• Purpose and need.

• Project description.

• Alternatives.

• Environmental setting.

• Probable impacts (direct, indirect/secondary, and cumulative impacts)

• Statement of the relationship of the action to land use plans, policies and controls for the affected area.

• Description of relationship between local short-term uses of humanity’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity

• Description of irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the action should it be implemented.

• All probable adverse environmental effects that cannot be avoided.

• Mitigation measures proposed to avoid, minimize, rectify, or reduce impact.

• Summary of unresolved issues.

• List of consulted parties.

• Reproductions of substantive comments received from the consulted parties and the responses to said comments made during the consultation process.

The Final EIS will contain the above plus the following:

• Incorporate substantive comments received during the Draft EIS review process.

• Reproductions of all letters received containing substantive questions, comments, and recommendations.

• List of persons, organizations, and public agencies commenting on the Draft EIS.

• Responses to each substantive question, comment, or recommendation received in the review process. The text will distinguish the changes made to the Draft EIS.

8. Will the EIS cover secondary impacts?

Yes. Act 2 states that the EIS should analyze the impacts of commercial harbor improvements associated with a large-capacity ferry vessel (direct impacts), as well as the impacts of a large-capacity ferry vessel company and its operations (secondary/indirect impacts).

9. What are secondary impacts?

Secondary impacts or indirect impacts are those impacts caused by the action that are later in time or further removed in distance but still reasonably foreseeable.

10. What is the schedule for completing this project?

The Draft EIS is scheduled for completion and distribution January 2009. It was originally scheduled for October 2008, however, due to extenuating circumstances, the distribution date is pushed back by three months. Specifically, the special studies within the Draft EIS are based upon the large-capacity ferry vessel’s operational plans and any proposals to change those plans would have a direct affect on the analysis. Rather than evaluating each change at the time it was proposed, certain studies for the Draft EIS were suspended until the operational plan was firmed up, or the time limit of Act 2 necessitated these studies to resume. The decision to resume studies was made in October 2008.

The Final EIS is scheduled for completion and distribution June 2009.

11. How much does the EIS cost, and who is paying for it?

The contract for preparation of the EIS is for $1.3 million, paid for by the DOT from funds collected from harbor user fees. The EIS fee covers the cost of technical studies by experts, consultation with agencies and other stakeholders, preparation and publication of the Draft EIS, response to comments on the Draft EIS, and preparation of the Final EIS, including the incorporation of substantive comments on the draft into the final document.

12. Will Superferry help pay for this EIS?

No. The DOT is the responsible agency for determining whether or not commercial harbor improvements implemented for a large-capacity ferry company are subject to Chapter 343, HRS, and if so, the preparation (including cost) of the appropriate environmental document (e.g., EA or EIS). While the EIS being conducted under Act 2 is not governed by Chapter 343, HRS, the DOT remains responsible for the preparation of the document and the cost.

13. How can I participate in the environmental review process?

Public meetings were held in March 2008 on each island. At these meetings, input was received for consideration in the EIS. Moreover, the Draft EIS will be made available for public review. Written comments may be submitted within the 45-day comment period. Any substantive comments received will be responded to in writing and, as appropriate, incorporated into the EIS.

14. When can I provide comments on the EIS?

The OEQC publishes a bimonthly bulletin (The Environmental Notice) listing statements and assessments that have been received. The review and comment period will start as of the date of notice in the OEQC bulletin. Comments should be submitted to the OEQC with a copy to the DOT at the following addresses:

To: Ms. Katherine Kealoha, Director

Office of Environmental Quality Control

235 South Beretania Street, Suite 702

Honolulu, HI 96813

and

Mr. Michael D. Formby, Deputy Director

DOT Harbors Division

79 South Nimitz Highway

Honolulu, HI 96813

15. Where can I review the EIS?

Copies of the Draft EIS will be available from the following:

1. Electronic copies can be downloaded at any one of the following websites:

a. OEQC: http://hawaii.gov/health/environmental/oeqc/index.html/

b. DOT: http://hawaii.gov/dot/harbors

2. Hard copies will be available at all regional and selected public libraries (locations to be announced by OEQC in The Environmental Notice).

3. Hard copies can be borrowed at OEQC, 235 South Beretania Street, Suite 702; Honolulu, Hawaii.

4. Electronic copies will be available on CD. To obtain a CD, please submit your request to:

Belt Collins Hawaii

2153 N. King Street, Suite 200

Honolulu, Hawaii 96819

Attn: Ms. Lesley A. Matsumoto

5. Paper copies will be available for the reproduction cost. To obtain a paper copy, please submit your request to Belt Collins Hawaii at the address above.

16. Were any public meetings held?

Yes, while the Act 2 does not require public meetings, the DOT determined it would be in the public interest to have meetings. Meetings were announced through local newspapers and held as follows:

1. March 11, 2008. Kaunakakai Elementary School Cafeteria, Molokai. 6 PM to 9 PM.

2. March 14, 2008. Farrington High School Auditorium, Oahu. 2 PM to 5 PM and 6 PM to 9 PM.

3. March 17, 2008. Baldwin High School Auditorium, Maui. 2 PM to 5 PM and 6 PM to 9 PM.

4. March 19, 2008. Kauai Community College Performing Arts Center, Kauai. 2 PM to 5 PM and 6 PM to 9 PM.

5. March 24, 2008. Hilo High School Auditorium, Hawaii Island. 2 PM to 5 PM and 6 PM to 9 PM.

6. March 27, 2008. Kealakehe High School Auditorium, Hawaii Island. 2 PM to 5 PM and 6 PM to 9 PM.

7. March 31. Lanai Elementary School Cafeteria, Lanai. 6 PM to 9 PM.

As mandated by Act 2, the final authority to accept a Final EIS will rest with OEQC. OEQC is responsible for ensuring that the following criteria are satisfied:

1. The procedures as described in Act 2 have been satisfied, including the consultation process, review and the preparation and submission of the EIS.

2. The content requirements as described in Act 2 have been satisfied.

3. Comments submitted during the Draft EIS review period have received responses satisfactorily and have been incorporated into the EIS.

Have at it,

Aloha, Brad

Carbon Emissions...Comparing Apples to Apples and Oranges to Oranges

Was starting to think today that I need to get going on reviewing the Act 2 'PEIS,' that's Scott's idea for a 'Pseudo-EIS.' I'll do another post later today about that.

Right now, though, Ken Stokes drew my attention to this:

Environment-Hawaii’s Pat Tummins was kind enough to include SusHI in her commentary on the Superferry, and went on to feature Jeff Mikulina and Brad Parsons regarding this boat’s “extravagant carbon footprint.”...

I tried to click over to Environment-Hawaii, but it requires a subscription, so I didn't get to read it. I can only surmise it must have been good because it got Ken Stokes all riled up again about comparing the carbon emissions of the Superferry to it's competitors based on cargo weight rather than just per passenger. I had formulated a logical response to that, but did not take the time to broadcast it until now in response to Ken. Here is that response:

1. Kauaibrad Says: Your comment is awaiting moderation.
   February 5th, 2009 at 1:29 pm

   Got an easy answer for ya’ Ken.

   When comparing carbon footprints we need to be comparing apples to apples and oranges to oranges.

   We should agree that the carbon footprint for transporting passengers (per passenger) is at least twice that for the Superferry compared to an interisland jet.

   Where we disagreed is that you wanted to further compare the Superferry to jets for weight or cargo. It took me a while of thinking about it, but for comparing carbon emissions based on weight or cargo transported we should be comparing Superferry’s emissions to that of Young Brothers. Young Brothers transports a lot more cargo than Aloha Air Cargo, and it is my contention that that is what you should more representatively compare Superferry to for cargo or weight transport.

   If you do that calculation accurately, I am confident it will show that Superferry has a much greater carbon footprint than Young Brothers (per given weight of cargo). The reason is because Superferry is burning a lot more fuel with more engine power doing the same transit a lot faster (than Young Brothers), faster than is economically justifiable (now and even more so in the future).
   

   There you go, Ken.

   Aloha, Brad

Oh, Man, this Guy Frickin' Pegged it...on LCS and aluminium, etc.

A two day old Op-Ed piece from a former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet:

From: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/01/ship-shopping-list/

"Ship Shopping List" by Adm. James Lyons (Ret.) February 1, 2009

COMMENTARY:

With the economy as the No. 1 priority for the new administration, there will probably be some form of a zero-based review of the federal budget.

Even with two ongoing wars, the Defense Department's budget will receive close scrutiny, as it should. Key programs could be canceled, delayed or changed.

However, the U.S. Navy's surface ship construction program is one of the key programs that needs to be expanded to meet current and future combat ship requirements. The Navy's force projection and assured nuclear strategic capability are key to our retaining U.S. pre-eminence as a world leader. The Navy's anti-ballistic intercept capability is another key element. Even with recognition of these requirements, there has been a loss of confidence in Congress over the ever-changing Navy ship construction programs that suffer from highly publicized cost overruns.

At present, the centerpiece of the Navy's surface ship construction program is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). Unfortunately, this program has suffered from a lack of professional oversight that resulted in multiple change orders, culminating in the cost of the first ship more than doubling from the original estimate of $220 million. The U.S. Navy plans to construct 55 LCS ships that can operate close to shore.

The undersecretary of defense for acquisition, John Young, said recently that the Navy is likelier to buy 64 or more of these ships, which cost about $550 million each.

The threat of piracy and the war on terror are given as justifications for the need of an LCS type ship. They are indeed weak reeds. If we changed the rules of engagement for the Task Force ships engaging the pirates and destroyed the shore-based infrastructure that supports their operations, piracy would become less attractive.

For a warship to stand by and do nothing as a hijacked ship is sailed to a pirate holding area should not be an option. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that a lightly armed defensive platform is marginally useful against terrorists operating ashore.

The LCS as originally conceived was to be stealthy; have a 50-knot speed capability; be operable by a small crew; and permit reconfiguration for different type of missions by changing onboard modules, including modules for detecting and countering mines. The costs of any of these modules are yet to be determined.

The overall costs of the LCS are largely driven by the speed requirement of 50 knots. It can be safely assumed that between 30 percent and 40 percent of the current hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) costs are directly attributed to the speed requirement. It is not transparently clear what a 50 knot capability (as opposed to 30 knots) confers in the threat today of Mach 1-plus air and surface launched guided-stealthy missiles plus 70-plus-knot torpedoes. Furthermore, in any type of seaway, the ship will not operate at 50 knots nor will it operate at 50 knots in 20 feet of water unless the intention is to dig a trench in the seabed.

Despite the stated requirement for stealth, it is not optimized in either of the LCS prototypes. Both ships display relatively large radar targets. The mono-hull (Lockheed) is derived from a fast yacht hull form and unsurprisingly, stealth was not an important consideration. The trimaran variant (General Dynamics) provides a radar "tunnel" to amplify the radar return from the ship when observed from certain aspects.

Moreover, both hull forms have inherent large and/or noisy acoustic signatures. Further, both prototypes will have predictability large infrared signatures when operating at higher speeds. Neither of these prototypes has anything but a very limited "point" air defense capability. In today's expanding threat environment, any ship designed to be a 21st-century warship is fatally flawed that costs more than $550 million and does not incorporate multiple fire-control systems and a reasonable area air defense capability against stealthy cruise missiles. The argument that an air defense "umbrella" for the LCS will be provided by other air and surface platforms is suspect, if only because the LCS is touted as a precursor weapons system, intended to "sanitize" littoral waters.

In the bid to reduce weight (for speed) both designs include significant amounts of aluminum, but little or no composites in their superstructure. One is almost all aluminum. We continue to ignore the lessons drawn from the Falklands war where British ships with aluminum superstructures burned to the gunwales in a littoral sea fight with Argentine aircraft-delivered iron bombs and French short-range Exocet missiles. Perhaps we should review the logic presented in the mid-1980s when we opted for an all-steel Arleigh Burke DDG-51 destroyer.

What should be done? The current Navy leadership inherited the LCS program. With the budget constraints Navy ship acquisition programs will face, we simply cannot afford to build a class of ships with the limited capabilities of an LCS. We should step back, acknowledge the LCS shortcomings and look at alternatives currently available.

The Norwegian Aegis frigate, which is a derivative of the Spanish F-100 Aegis frigate, is a candidate that should receive careful consideration. It has a speed of 28 knots; is stealthy and is capable in terms of area AAW and ASW with its Aegis combat system, electro-optical director; hull mounted and towed array sonar, two MK82 fire-control radars, and 127MM and 76MM guns. It also has the capability to host organic manned and unmanned air and surface vehicles. The cost for this very capable warship is about $600 million. Its draft is 5 meters, which also compares favorably with the LCS.

Changing the program is the first step. To ensure proper management and oversight, the Navy must also rebuild its in-house civilian technical capability which in the past played major roles in bridging the gap between combat commanders' stated requirements and the contract specifications given to industry in the procurement of ships, aircraft and weapon systems.

A recent study concluded that the Navy's in-house technical capability (civilian and naval officer) has been greatly diminished and is rapidly losing capability and capacity. The disciplines involved in building a commercial ship in no way translate to building a warship. There are no short cuts.

The Navy needs to rebuild the civilian technologist community by providing a clear career path. The Navy also needs to rebuild the Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community. The two-year Naval Architecture/Marine Engineering Master's program at the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which was canceled two years ago, should be reinstated.

There is no question that numbers of ship matter, but combat capability and survivability should be the governing criteria. The notion that somehow "little" combatants are expendable is nonsense. Certainly the crews are not, nor are the ships. Unfortunately, we don't have the luxury of time to redesign a small combatant. Until we do, we should embrace the European-Norwegian Aegis-type Frigate, which was principally designed for "littoral combat."

James Lyons, U.S. Navy retired admiral, was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and deputy chief of naval operations, where he was principal adviser on all Joint Chiefs of Staff matters.

Aloha, Brad

HSF Voyage Status...

There's a little bit of a low pressure front swell out there, but no matter, 'cause:

Annual drydocking for maintenance and recertification will begin February 2 through February 17. Reservations have been blocked out during this period.

Waitin' on the SC decision,
Aloha, Brad

Larry's Idea...Turn it into the Hot new Restaurant in Honolulu...Literally

...apparently the PUC likes this too?...

Wednesday, January 28, 2009
TCM's ConTempo Date Set for April 18
"Hawaii Superferry Makes Fundraising Debut"
by Charlie Aldinger

It's bon voyage time.  The Contemporary Museum's major fundraiser,
ConTempo 2009: A Superferry Soiree, will have a new nautical home
this year, according to event co-chairpersons Cherye Pierce and
Tiana Torii. TCM's gala aboard the Hawaii Superferry will include a
Waikiki cocktail-and-pupus cruise with a gourmet dinner catered by
Chai's Island Bistro in the Hawaii Superferry Terminal following the
cruise. Other activities will include a silent auction and contemporary
art sale with dancing and live entertainment...

Premium tables of ten are available at $25,000 (Luminaries), $15,000
(Visionaries), $10,000 (Benefactors), $7,000 (Patrons) and $5,000
(Sponsors). Individual tickets are also available at $500 per person. 
Premium table sales have already begun and reservations are available
by calling Gordon Wong... Pierce and Torii are anticipating brisk
reservations because of the location of this year's event.

...ConTempo revelers will board the Hawaii Superferry from 5:45 to
6:30 p.m., then cruise along the shores of Waikiki towards Diamond Head
and beyond, returning around 8:15 p.m. (For port security reasons, all
guests will be required to show a picture ID before boarding.)

Dinner and dancing will resume until 11:30 p.m. in the Hawaii Superferry
Terminal after disembarking.

Toss your black ties

Suggested dress is nautical chic and dressy cocktail attire, with boat-
appropriate shoes recommended as stair-climbing will be a part of the
boarding process. Jackets for the men are requested...


Just don't go too far beyond Hawai'i Kai,
Aloha, Brad

LCS Goin' Down...

...or at least the DoD should be paying half of what they've been paying for aluminium and steel. From the New Wars blog:

"And So It Begins..."

Obama calls for Defense Cuts of 10% starting in 2010. From Fox News:

The Obama administration has asked the military’s Joint Chiefs of Staff to cut the Pentagon’s budget request for the fiscal year 2010 by more than 10 percent — about $55 billion — a senior U.S. defense official tells FOX News.

Last year’s defense budget was $512 billion. Service chiefs and planners will be spending the weekend “burning the midnight oil” looking at ways to cut the budget — looking especially at weapons programs, the defense official said.

Recalling cuts from the Clinton Era, I am thinking anything transformational, untraditional, or cheap (recall the arsenal ships and the Armored Gun System, both of which would have been ready and most useful in the War on Terror )will likely be the first target. Perhaps, though with Gates still at the helm, my skepticism will be unfounded. H/T to CDR Salamander.

Response to "And So It Begins..."

1. Ken Adams, Amphib Sailor Says:
   January 31, 2009 at 4:27 pm

   This is going to cut bone, especially if President Obama’s stated intent to grow the Army and Marines by 92,000 holds true. To get there, DoD will have to hold or grow personnel funding, multiplying the impact of top line cuts on the procurement and RDT&E accounts. I see a 26% decrease in procurement coming from this 10% delta.

Something noticed recently on LCS from the Information Dissemination Naval blog:

...There are a ton of lessons to learn not only about the platform itself, but also the concept of operations. I think we will see these lessons begin to emerge as part of the discussion late this year. For those looking where the conversation might start, keep an eye on the combat system, because there will be a push to go with a single combat system among all LCS models. If you aren't aware, the GD and LM versions of the LCS each have a unique combat system, which at the time may have been a good idea, but isn't anymore. Posted by Galrahn at 12:00 AM

If you want to read some good articles and analysis on LCS, click here - Labels: LCS

Aloha, Brad

Forget about LCS, Concensus building around JHSV INSTEAD?

Interesting blog entry from elsewhere on this:

The JHSV Threat to LCS

Sean Meade at the Ares Blog echoes yours truly’s call for replacing the costly LCS for high speed vessels:

The JHSV accomplishes every mission that the LCS is capable with the exception of fire support. In many ways that mission is better performed by other platforms and the US’ orientation toward soft power exercises (especially in South America) will be the ultimate proving ground for vessels of this type. Its high transit speed makes it very enticing as a rapid transport for the Army’s Air Assault Expeditionary Force, Stryker Brigades, and Marine Expeditionary Units. Instead of a piecemeal arrival of forces, the JHSV will allow complete unit insertion for whatever the need may be-either humanitarian assistance or preventative war operations.

In the mothership role, the JHSV could support smaller armed warships that could take up the fire support mission.

This entry was posted on January 30, 2009 at 2:53 pm and is filed under seapower.

Aloha, Brad

Where the Hell did that Mauibrad dude go?

For those of you wondering where I've been, have been posting a lot over the past number of days on my other blog www.alohaanalytics.blogspot.com. I'll be back here shortly.

Aloha, Brad

"Clarifying Misperceptions about the Superferry"

Excellent collaborative Op-Ed in the Kaua'i newspaper today:

From: http://www.kauaiworld.com/articles/2009/01/26/opinion/kauai/doc497d331b4f8ac160221093.txt

"Clarifying Misperceptions about the Superferry"
By Andrea Brower, George Inouye, Nani Rogers and Ed Coll
Published: Monday, January 26, 2009

Hawai‘i Superferry has been debated in Hawai‘i ever since the newly elected Gov. Lingle assigned her chief of staff, Bob Awana, to personally consult and expedite the HSF project back in 2002.

Since then, volumes of information have reached every Hawai‘i resident; factual and informative, partial and biased, sometimes not true at all. As a result, public opinion has formed up around ideology and personal interest, often without basis in fact. Here, then, are four common misperceptions about the Superferry.

The first misperception is that a study just released, mandated by the Oct. 31, 2007 Act II legislation, is a legitimate environmental impact statement. That report, being called an EIS, is lacking a critical component of a true Environmental Impact Statement, as defined in the National and Hawai‘i Environmental Policy Acts. Both include an option of “no action.”

That means if the study shows that environmental impacts are very serious and cannot be mitigated, then the project must be terminated. An EIS should be conducted before the start of a project in the same way that a driver should be licensed and the car have a safety check before being allowed on the road.

The misnamed “EIS” recently released by the contractor Belt Collins omits the “no action” alternative; it was custom-tailored by the legislature in special session to suit the needs of HSF. That means that any findings, no matter how disastrous to the environment, will not get in the way of the company’s operations.

The second misperception, fostered by the Lingle administration, is that there is no connection between HSF and the military. In its Public Utilities application in July 2004, HSF Inc. “anticipated that an entire battalion of 350 Stryker tanks will be able to be transported from O‘ahu to their training grounds on the Big Island in four trips...”

Soon after that, CEO John Lehman was quoted in Pacific Business News as saying the Superferry “will make it easier for soldiers to train when the Stryker Brigade comes to Hawai‘i.”

The third misperception, being against HSF is to be against alternative modes of transportation. This is a false division. Almost all “Superferry protesters” are in favor of an inter-island ferry service. How would these ferries be different? They would carry passengers only, with some cargo capacity.

That would substantially reduce the threat of invasive pest transfer and removal of already depleted ocean and mountain resources from the outer islands. No more searching of vehicles and personal property. Their speed would be like that of other inter-island vessels, the danger to whales being nearly eliminated. The ferries would be sized appropriately for our travel needs, would have a clean, cost-effective propulsion system and would be Hawai‘i-owned, either privately or publicly.

The fourth misperception is that those opposed to the Superferry don’t care about the economy. Hawaii’s economy starts and ends with our environment and our indigenous culture. It is worth noting that in a poll by National Geographic Travel Magazine to select favorite island vacation destinations, in which O‘ahu placed 104 out of 111 choices, poll respondents cited overdevelopment of the island and trivialization and commercialization of the Hawaiians’ culture.

Hawai‘i Superferry, publicizing itself as the H4, extends that develop-and-exploit mindset to the outer islands. Where did Kaua‘i place in that poll? 64th.

If viewed in the context of promoting a healthy local economy, those who think Superferry would be good for business should be careful what they wish for. Businesses on O‘ahu, from plumbers to surf instructors, would leap at the opportunity to expand to Kaua‘i. And with their higher sales volume allowing for lower profit margin, they would be very competitive indeed.

In a larger context, for many on the neighbor islands, a good portion of what they put on the table comes from the mountains and the sea. Unlike O‘ahu, we have considerable remaining natural resources.

When oil prices climb again, and traditional jobs and money become more scarce, these resources and our agricultural lands, our “natural” economy, will be needed to bridge us to a future where we must supply much more of our own needs, while maintaining and restoring the resources as well.

The real equation is: To oppose Superferry is to oppose the way the democratic process was completely discarded. Gov. Lingle bent over backward to give a New York corporation, the HSF, whatever it wanted, when it wanted.

That included calling the special session to craft a law, the constitutionality of which is now being questioned by the Hawai‘i Supreme Court.

Here we have neither a company nor an administration that have shown respect for our local communities.

• Andrea Brower is a coordinator for Malama Kaua‘i. George Inouye is a Westside fisherman. Nani Rogers is a Kanaka Maoli activist. Ed Coll is a teacher at Kaua‘i Community College.

February $28 Inter-island fares; Meanwhile Lingle/DOT asking for a Measly few million more for this

Have been reading over all of the PUC, Consumer Advocate, statutory, and Act 2 documentation regarding how false assumptions were relied upon in determining 'public convenience and necessity' on this.

One of the key assumptions was that HSF would be able to price themselves profitably at 1/2 the price of inter-island airfares. That ain't happenin' at these airfares, and it won't happen later either because HSF's fuel cost structure per passenger is greater than for inter-island jet flights.

Another assumption that hasn't held is that reported ridership demand for HSF's services on average for the past year, except for the summer months, hasn't even gotten to break-even for them. Meaning that given the design they are using, consumer need and demand hasn't been enough to enabled them to even break-even beyond the 2 - 3 summer months. Anyway, that is another post that is almost ready.

The following is something I heard Ron Wiley advertising on the radio similar to what Go! is offering, which HSF cannot match contrary to goals stated in their PUC filings. Notice the nice comfortable-looking large seating in the below pictures at http://www.mokuleleairlines.com/Home.html:

Christie Wilson had a couple of good front page articles in today's paper here and here. Apparently Belt Collins now wants 70% more than originally asked for to finish the Act 2 pseudo-EIS, up to a cool $1.7 mil. Shoot, the whole thing shoulda been done for a couple hundred thou. DOT-Harbors wants another $1 to $1.5 million to fix the Kahului barge mooring system. And DOT-Harbors wants another $250,000 to $350,000 to clear out the productive fishing boats at the end of Pier 19/20 to make room for HSF II, the one that's expected to have it's own ramp. In total, the Lingle Administration is now asking for a few million more in 'unforeseen' expenses that have come about because a real E.I.S. wasn't done.

Wonder how much more money this thing's gonna need? Ever heard of cuttin' your losses? You know, in Washington and Alaska viable ferry systems are owned by the state. Meanwhile, high school kids mentioned to me today that their after-school activities, athletic and other events are being cut back by the Governor and State. The kids wondered why they're getting the cuts and the ferry keeps getting more money. I didn't have a good answer for them, at least not that they would find acceptable.

Regarding the Supreme Court case, it has taken so long, that I am starting to think there has been incredible pressure put upon the Justices to cave in and uphold Act 2. Will be pleasantly surprised if that turns out to not be the case.

Aloha, Brad

"How About 'Bump Detectors' for the Superferry?"

Lee Tepley, Ph.D. released the following today:

"How about 'Bump detectors' for the Superferry?" -- Feel free to circulate
by Lee Tepley, Ph.D.

...Before the present case was initiated before the Hawaii Supreme Court, I had put in a lot of time documenting the threats to whales caused by fast ferries...

Anyhow, Koohan [Paik]’s request started me thinking about the Superferry again. I had expected that the Superferry, now into it’s 2nd whale season, would have hit a few whales but - so far - no collisions have been reported. Why not??

Perhaps no collisions have occurred – or perhaps they have occurred but were not observed or reported.

After a bit of thought, I realized that it would be difficult to verify a collision even if there was no attempt at a cover-up.

Consider a case where one or more whales surface a short distance in front of the Superferry which is charging along at it’s usual 40 mph. Maybe the Superferry pilot sees the whales and attempts to manuever or slow down – but in a few seconds the whales would be close to the pontoons – and a few seconds later the Superferry would have passed over the whales whether or not there had been a collison. And in another 10 seconds the Superferry would be far ahead of the whales – so, if they were hit, their bleeding bodies would quickly disappear in the distance. They might drift out to sea or, perhaps, be eaten by sharks.

And if the Superferry did hit a whale, would there be a detectable bump?? A simple calculation shows that if the whale weighed less than 10 tons (baby or juvenile), the bump would be very small and might not be felt. If the whale were full grown (about 100 tons), the bump would probably be felt. But so what?? The disturbance would last for only a few seconds. Would anyone bother to report it?? And without a dead body, the bump would not really prove anything.

However, dead Humpbacks might drift in to shore and onto a beach – as dead Sperm whales often do in the Canary Islands when they are hit by fast ferries similar to the Hawaii Superferry. And, if this happened, their cut-up bodies could strongly suggest an impact with...sharp pontoons.

But the distances between the Hawaiian Islands are much greater than the distances between the Canary Islands – and the Hawaiian islands don’t have nearly as many beaches as the Canaries – so the odds of dead whales drifting ashore are much less in Hawaii than in the Canaries. Dead whales would most likely drift out to sea.
[Dead whales tell no tails...--Ed.]

So it might take many years before a collision between the Superferry and a whale is ever verified. The way things are now, all we can do is wait.

But there are ways of detecting ship-whale collisions – although the Superferry people will not like them. Duane Erway, Dr. Alex Reynolds and myself have already suggested them at various Superferry meetings and they are discussed in detail on my web site. Go to:

http://web.mac.com/leetepley/Site/Introduction.html

Then link to the page: Detecting Whale Collisions - Kona EIS Scoping Meeting

The Superferry Company has, of course, ignored our suggestions – so it is time to bring them up again.

In this high-tech world, there are a number of gadgets that can be used to detect ship-whale collisions. Cory Harden suggested calling them “Bump Detectors.” Four such bump detectors are outlined below. For redundancy, they should probably all be employed at once.

Upon a ship-whale collision, they would all put out electrical signals which would be recorded on a hard drive on the Superferry. The hard drive must not be accessible to the Superferry’s crew. It would have to be removed periodically and the data would be analyzed on a computer by an independent observer.

Installing the bump detectors and analyzing the data would cost money – but what’s a few bucks to the Superferry company? They seem happy to lose money on almost every voyage.

The bump detectors are as follows:

Bump Detector #1 - Accelerometer. This device measures acceleration directly. A unit should be placed on the front of each pontoon. The electrical signal will indicate the magnitude of the bump.

Bump Detector #2 - Hydrophone. This is an underwater microphone. One should be mounted on the front of each pontoon near an accelerometer. It will put out an electrical signal proportional to the sound made by a body hitting the pontoon.

The electrical signals from the accelerometers and hydrophones will be redundant. They will both identify collisions but will not show the cause of the collisions so the recorded data will not be conclusive.

Bump Detector #3 - Low intensity, high frequency, forward-looking Sonar. Sonar systems should be mounted on both pontoons. They would provide a crude picture of marine mammals approaching and striking a pontoon. It would be necessary to look at the sonar data only at times immediately preceeding a bump as detected by the accelerometers and/or hydrophones. The sonar signals would not be strong enough to cause hearing damage to marine mammals that do not strike the pontoons. Many high frequency sonars are similar to fish finders.

Bump Detector #4 - Video camera. This would give an accurate picture of marine mammals approaching and striking the pontoons. They would have to be carefully mounted to avoid water bubbles forming in front of the camera housing and ruining the picture. A collision might destroy a camera housing but not before the picture was sent to the hard drive. The video signal would have to be analyzed only in the time interval just before a collision activates an accelerometer or hydrophone. It could be erased at all other times so video data would use very little drive space.

Data from the above four bump detectors would result in accurate and undeniable identification of collisions between marine mammals and the Superferry.

Cory Harden believes that it is important for you to include the use of bump detectors in your comments on the phony pseudo-EIS. I hope that Cory is right.

Aloha,
Lee Tepley

From the Passenger who Called in the HSF Incident Yesterday

[Joan Conrow has a good post today Friday, January 23, 2009, on much of this at Musings: No Look, No See.--Ed.]

I wish I could share all of the discussion about this, but I feel I don't have permission. Instead, Karen Chun does a good job in summarizing and quoting from an interview with the passenger who called in the report to officials. That passenger was apparently interviewed disrespectfully at his home Thursday morning by a state official. That passenger has lived his whole life on Maui and knows the ocean well. Here is Karen Chun's report on it.

Here was one reply to the discussion that Karen reports on:

"...Very nicely stated. Since they came to full stop, it would be interesting to know whether they made any real effort to determine if a whale was actually hit. Did an officer go to the back of the HSF and make an observation? Did they record their exact location? Report it? And ask other boats/ships to help report a possibly injured whale?--D..."


Aloha, Brad